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 GUDNI TH. JÓHANNESSON
Did he matter?
The Colourful Andrew Gilchrist and the first 
Cod War between Britain and Iceland, 1958-61
Introduction
This paper is inspired by one of the grand debates in history – the role of individuals in the course
of events. At the risk of gross oversimplification we have the preference for “structure” on the
one hand and “contingency” or “chance” on the other.1 The actions of Andrew Gilchrist, Britain’s
Ambassador in Reykjavík at the beginning of the first “cod war” between Iceland and Britain in
1958, will be used here almost as a case study into the conflict between ‘structure’ and ‘chance.’
What difference, if any, did he make? Would not all have happened more or less as it did, regard-
less of his conduct? While this analysis is certainly not as sweeping as, say, an examination of the
importance of Hitler or Stalin in the greater scheme of things, it is likelier to yield more concrete
results for the following reasons:
– The ‘cod war,’ a dispute over fishing limits off Iceland which led to skirmishes between Icelan-
dic gunboats and British trawlers and warships, was a comparatively small episode where, pre-
sumably, the effects of individuals are relatively easy to weigh and measure.
– Even so, there were also obvious underlying causes which made a conflict of some kind likely,
regardless of the actions and behaviour of individuals in the short term.
– In Reykjavík, Andrew Gilchrist was an energetic servant of the Crown, while statesmen and
officials in London usually had little interest in, or knowledge of, the dispute. Thus, he would
seem to have been in a good position to influence the events.
– Icelandic observers have harshly criticised Gilchrist for his conduct during the dispute, bla-
ming him for ‘arrogance’ and a total misunderstanding of political realities in Iceland. Alle-
gedly, this had unfortunate effects on decision-making in London.2
– Two further ‘cod wars,’ which were akin to the first dispute in a number of basic ways, occurred
when Gilchrist was not at all involved. We have what is virtually a historical ‘laboratory’
scenario, therefore, allowing us to compare the course of events with and without the inter-
ventions of the energetic Ambassador.
“Structure”: The Origins of a Fishing Dispute
The underlying origins of the ‘cod war’ can be traced to the 19th century when Britain was the
undisputed master of the high seas and the narrow three-mile rule of territorial waters was an
important tenet of British supremacy. Around 1890, British trawlers began to work the rich fis-
hing grounds around Iceland and in 1901, the authorities in Copenhagen, which then ruled the
island, signed a treaty with London on that limit off its shores. In 1944, the Icelanders gained full
independence from Denmark and soon began the quest for control over fish stocks in their adja-
cent waters, sincerely worried about overfishing, totally reliant on fishing for exports and encou-
287
raged by the fact that the law of the sea was developing in favour of coastal states. In 1949, the
three-mile treaty was denounced and in two steps – in 1950 and 1952 – the Icelandic fishing zone
was extended from three to four miles, and encompassed the wide bays and fjords of Iceland.3
The British trawling industry was furious and imposed a ban on the landings of iced fish which
the Icelanders brought to British ports. This coercion certainly had the potential to hurt Iceland,
which relied to a large degree on that market. London was not directly involved but hoped that
the embargo would break the authorities in Reykjavík.4 Although officials admitted in private
that the sanctions probably contravened Britain’s treaty obligations and domestic laws on ‘crimi-
nal conspiracy,’5 acceptance of the Icelandic action was impossible for closely connected reasons
which can be called the five ‘p’s’ of pressure, prestige, principle, precedence and power:
First, the British distant-water trawling industry was an effective pressure group which wield-
ed considerable power in the Fisheries Departments in Whitehall.6 Secondly, Britain’s prestige
was involved. How could a great naval power tolerate a clear infringement of its perceived fun-
damental interests? Thirdly, the general principle of narrow territorial waters would be weake-
ned by acquiescence off Iceland.7 Fourthly, the danger of negative precedence, especially in the
North Atlantic, was ever present. It was imperative, as one worried official noted in the Foreign
Office, to ‘prevent the infection spreading to the Faroes and Greenland.’8 Finally, the apparent
presence of superior power made it inherently tempting to use it. 
The ban bit at first but the Icelanders quickly found alternative outlets for their fish, not least
in the Soviet Union which, by signing a huge oil-for-fish agreement with Iceland in 1953, decided
to play on an emerging problem within the NATO.9 The country was a founding member of the
alliance and the US military base at Keflavik was deemed invaluable for western defences in the
North Atlantic. Moscow-oriented socialists also polled a fifth of the vote in elections, however,
and neutralist tendencies were strong. Hence, the eastward orientation caused great concern in
Washington, and the United States put pressure on Britain to have the ban removed.10
Direct and indirect support from the world’s superpowers proved stronger than intimidation in
British ports. The coercion no longer worked, but what could then be done? Could London ignore
pressure, accept slight to prestige, abandon a cherished principle and set a dangerous precedent?
The question, however, could be put differently: What could be done but face the facts? The plain
truth was that Iceland’s pieces of power added up to more than Britain’s. In 1955, Whitehall offi-
cials reacted to reports from Reykjavík about the possibility of further extensions by concluding
that British trawlers should then be offered naval protection.11 ‘[O]nly by using force at some
stage,’ said one of them, ‘will we ever bring the Icelanders to accept a compromise settlement.’12
Things were heating up.
The currents which went back to the 19th century, coupled with more recent developments
after the Second World War, thus explain why a serious fishing dispute between Britain and Ice-
land was likely to break out. We realise, in other words, how a conflict came. It is a different task
now to recount how the ‘cod war’ of 1958 broke out and it is here that Andrew Gilchrist enters
the scene.
“What about Andrew Gilchrist?” An Eager Diplomat is Promoted to Iceland
In the early 1950s, two Ministers served in the British Legation in Reykjavík. First, the ‘light-
weight’ John Dee Greenway had been given Iceland as his last post before retirement.13 Although
an intelligent man, he was far from industrious and as the dispute over the fishing limit was sim-
mering, both the Icelanders and foreign diplomats in Reykjavík wondered why Britain kept such
a ‘weak’ man there.14 When Greenway belatedly concerned himself with the conflict, he sided
completely with the Icelanders, much to the chagrin of officials in Whitehall. The Minister was
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sidelined and could only resort to marking Foreign Office telegrams about the rigid British stance
with such expressions as ‘pooh!’ ‘why?’ and ‘!!!’15
In early 1953, Greenway was replaced by James Thyne Henderson, a man of a slightly higher
standing in the Diplomatic Service who was, as he put it himself, hurried off to Reykjavík to ‘do
something.’16 He had clearly been briefed about the need to stand up to the Icelanders and did so
at first, but soon came to call for acquiescence to their wishes. The new Minister had no sympa-
thy for the Icelandic cause but grudgingly admitted that the correlation of power in the conflict
would ultimately benefit Iceland.17 Henderson never said so to the Icelanders, however, and they
in turn disliked his apparent obstinacy and toughness.18 Moreover, the recommendations from
Reykjavík were not welcomed in London. ‘Mr. Henderson seems to argue,’ one official com-
plained, ‘that because the Icelanders are not prepared to yield we must at all costs get the problem
settled at this end.’19
As with Greenway, Henderson underestimated the constraints on British decision-making and
both of them may also have suffered from ‘localitis,’ the tendency of some diplomats to sympa-
thise overly much with the views of their host country.20 But most importantly, Greenway’s and
Henderson’s correct estimates of the options open did not jibe with the prevalent perceptions and
prejudices in London. It is indeed tempting to view Whitehall discussions on Iceland as a symp-
tom of ‘groupthink,’ the established concept in decision-making theory which is used to describe
a group’s thinking ‘when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to rea-
listically appraise alternative courses of action.’21 Admittedly, government ministers and officials
often argued about what to do but they all agreed that the new Icelandic regulations could not be
accepted. The ‘group’ that Whitehall represented disregarded negative input and had no place for
unconventional thinking.22
Would Andrew Gilchrist conform more to the customary outlook in London? He was born in
1910, entered the old British colonial service in 1933, and was based in Bangkok when Japan en-
tered the Second World War in 1941. Gilchrist was interned for eight months but then released.
Three years later he joined the Special Operations Executive and saw active service in India. After
the war he reapplied to join the Foreign Office and served in consular posts in Bangkok, Stuttgart
and Singapore before arriving in Iceland in the late summer of 1956.23 By then, a left-wing coali-
tion had come to power in Iceland, not only committed to another extension of the fishing limit
but ostensibly determined to expel the Americans from the island. The removal of the landing
ban had become more urgent than ever before.24 Iceland was a promotion for the relatively young
diplomat who was not in line to be in charge of a mission.25 Apparently, Gilchrist was sent to Rey-
kjavík because at least two more senior diplomats had rejected the offer. ‘What about Andrew
Gilchrist?’ an exasperated figure on the Foreign Office Selection Board is said to have queried,
remembering that he was a keen angler so surely he knew a fair bit about fish. And had he not
specialised in communism when he was Consul General in Stuttgart in the early 1950s?26 The
post was Gilchrist’s – a historical ‘chance’ indeed.
“You do not fully accept the views on the local situation.” 
Gilchrist Learns the Realities of Reporting from Reykjavík
The new minister’s first impressions of Reykjavík consisted of verbal abuse which teenagers hur-
led at British sailors on land leave.27 Notwithstanding his anger over such treatment, he imme-
diately understood that the ineffectual landing ban had to go. There was nothing ‘humiliating’
about a graceful defeat, Gilchrist emphasised in October 1956: ‘Surely the humiliation lies in the
regrettable but total failure of our big stick, not in the acknowledgement of failure in a gentle-
manly way.’28
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Two years earlier, low-key negotiations on an end to
the sanctions had begun in Paris, under the auspices of
OEEC, the Organisation for European Economic Co-
operation. In early 1956, they had almost succeeded
but domestic complications in Iceland and Britain pre-
vented a solution. The trawler-owners, de facto spo-
kesmen of the industry, had a ‘veto’ on any proposal as
one member of the Foreign Office privately admit-
ted.29 By fall, they still showed a reluctance to lift the
embargo unless Iceland pledged not to extend the limit
again for some specified period. That would never hap-
pen and Gilchrist was appalled when he read reports of
the stalemate, wanting to tell the concerned officials in
London that he did not ‘see or sense anything to indi-
cate that you told the trawler-owners straight out that
the maintenance of the ban was contrary to the inte-
rests of Her Majesty’s Government.’ He decided not to
send these thoughts but still wondered to himself why
his advice had not been heeded:
a) You do not fully accept the views on the local situa-
tion which I have been putting forward from Reyk-
javík.
b) There are wider factors with which I am unac-
quainted.
c) The trawler-owners are too tough to be subject to
Foreign Office influence.30
Gilchrist was finding out the lot of a low-ranking diplomat in a marginal outpost: He was neither
listened to nor let in on much. In November 1956 the ban was finally lifted after the owners real-
ised that the Icelanders would not grant them the guarantee they were after and that the British
authorities had grown very irritated over their intransigence. Afterwards, Gilchrist tried to claim
much more credit for the settlement than was his due, quoting the Foreign Minister of Iceland,
Gudmundur Í. Gudmundsson, as saying that the dispute was ‘not settled in Paris. It could never have
been settled in Paris. It was settled here, in Reykjavík, by you and me.’31 This exaggeration was
characteristic of a proud and aspiring envoy who wanted to make a difference. He hardly had any-
thing to do with the final result and the frustration at the time was more accurate. On the other hand,
Gilchrist had quickly gained a good knowledge of Icelandic realities. Already in the fall of 1956 he
was warning that ‘we may be in for more trouble on limits sooner or later—I have never expec-
ted anything else.’32 Again, however, he was to find out that his words fell on deaf ears in London.
“I would quite like to see ... what our line is likely to be.” Gilchrist and the Geneva
Conference, February-April, 1958
In 1957, the Icelandic government decided to postpone any action on the fishing limit until the
international community had discussed the issue. In February 1958, the first United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea began in Geneva and for Britain the occasion provided an
opportunity, apart from the general prospect of a world-wide agreement on territorial waters, to
establish a lasting settlement off Iceland. On the eve of the conference, Gilchrist (now an ambas-
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Andrew Gilchrist, Minister and Ambassador
to Iceland, 1956-59. Gilchrist later received
a knighthood and wrote a book on his stay in
Iceland, called “Cod Wars and How to Lose
Them.” (Brain Holt Photograph Collection,
Reykjavík)
sador after the upgrade of the British and Icelandic missions in Reykjavík and London) accurately
predicted that ‘[t]he only place where a bridge can be built is at Geneva. If we don’t build a bridge,
we shall be confronted with unilateral extensions, as sure as eggs is eggs.’33
International currents had continued to flow in Iceland’s favour. Some South American states
wanted national jurisdiction to as many as 200 miles, the communist bloc advocated twelve-mile
territorial waters and many newly independent nations considered narrow limits a colonial tool
to continue exploitation of their resources.34 In late 1957, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Senior Legal
Adviser in the Foreign Office, warned that the three-mile rule would never be ratified at the con-
ference. The Fisheries Departments seemed willing to accept a six-mile compromise but the
Admiralty and the Chiefs of Staff insisted that Britain must maintain the three-mile limit, or at
least the rights for overflying and innocent passage up to that line.35
Gilchrist heard little of the ongoing debates in Whitehall about the British stance. ‘I would
quite like to see an occasional bit of paper on what our line is likely to be at the conference,’ he
meekly complained at one stage and got most of his information about developments at Geneva
from Icelandic newspapers.36 As expected, the event went badly for Britain. Canada offered the
most realistic compromise, a three-mile territorial sea with an additional nine-mile exclusive fis-
heries zone. The British delegation stuck to the old three-mile rule, however, and only reluc-
tantly offered an alternative late in the day: six-mile territorial waters with certain maritime
rights up to three miles from shore. This was not bridge-building. From Reykjavík, Gilchrist
suggested that Britain should instead accept the Canadian proposal – if the Icelanders declared
that while they were determined to assert their right over twelve miles, they would respect the
interests of other states and only extend to six miles for a trial period of two years or so. He added
that even this offer might well fail to placate the Icelandic authorities.37 Too much water had
already flowed under the (non-existent) bridge.
Andrew Gilchrist accepted that the Icelandic point of view could not determine general policy
on territorial waters. He did his duty to accurately judge the mood in Iceland and his formula was
in fact very similar to the deal which Britain accepted in 1961, after a bitter ‘cod war.’ The pro-
blem was not that he was ahead of his time, but that British policy-makers lagged behind, pulled
back by the five ‘p’s’ of pressure, prestige, principle, precedence and power.
International unity proved impossible at Geneva. On April 27, the conference ended in failure
as far as the width of territorial waters was concerned, and in London the self-criticism immedi-
ately began. ‘The three-mile limit is a dead duck,’ one official asserted a few weeks later and Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice pointed out that the six-mile offer, the main element in Britain’s battle plan,
had always been a ‘non-starter.’38 In legal literature, the British performance during the confer-
ence has been cited to support the contention that ‘the lesson of the Sibylline books is to accept
the possible when it is still timely.’39 The conservatism at Geneva is also a small example of a grea-
ter theme in Britain’s post-war history: the reluctance to adapt swiftly to changed interests and
capabilities.40 It was small wonder, therefore, that an inexperienced Ambassador in tiny Iceland
could do nothing about it.
“I hope if we threaten we can perform.” Gilchrist and the Decision to Use Force
After the failure at Geneva, a conflict was almost inevitable, as Gilchrist had correctly noted.
Within the Icelandic government, the communist/socialist People’s Alliance demanded an imme-
diate extension to twelve miles. Although the centre-left parties in the coalition – the Social
Democrats and the Progressive Party – wanted to leave scope for talks with Britain and perhaps
temporary concessions, they would also insist on some recognition of a twelve-mile limit. The
same went for the right-wing Independence Party in opposition.41
291
What could then be done? Back in 1955, naval protection had of course been suggested in
Whitehall but the prospect of implementation had not been as real at that time. And on closer
look, the use or threat of force against an ally in the NATO seemed out of the question. ‘I don’t
suppose for a moment that Her Majesty’s Government will try such a policy,’ Gilchrist main-
tained in early 1957.42 About a year later, Thomas Brimelow in the Northern Department of the
Foreign Office also argued against the involvement of the Royal Navy in a struggle against the
Icelanders.43
Despite the dismissal of firm action, Gilchrist had certainly not become a great supporter of the
rulers in Reykjavík and when Icelandic newspapers carried reports on British declarations at
Geneva about the determination to defend the three-mile rule, he was incredulous, but pleased.
‘Are we really making official threats?’ he telegraphed to London in mid-April: ‘I hope if we
threaten we can perform. Nothing would please me better.’44 The Foreign Office quickly pointed
out that the news from Geneva was exaggerated and on reflection, Gilchrist was to add that he
simply could not see the United States ‘allowing’ Britain to apply coercion against a country
where it had such important strategic interests.45 After all, the American administration had
forced Britain to back down over Suez two years earlier. Furthermore, Gilchrist’s almost juvenile
joy over the prospect of British boldness highlights how little he was involved in British decision-
making. It also turned out that his disbelief was unfounded. On May 12, despite the obvious geo-
political disadvantages, the Foreign Office recommended that if the Icelandic fishing limit was
extended the Royal Navy would sail to the disputed waters to protect British trawlers from
harassment by Icelandic gunboats.46
Never did Gilchrist’s opinions or despatches figure largely in the reaching of that conclusion in
the Foreign Office. On May 12, the day of the final decision there, he even wrote that ‘the argu-
ments against the warlike action I presume to be still far too strong.’47 And it must have galled the
ambitious Ambassador when Sir Paul Gore-Booth, a senior official in the Foreign Office, wrote
later in the month that although his ‘vivid’ despatches were appreciated, would he ‘constantly
bear in mind number and magnitude of urgent problems confronting us at present and keep tele-
grams to minimum number and length.’48 At the highest levels, there was little time to examine
a particular predicament in every detail.49 Vague knowledge and preconceptions had to suffice,
coupled with self-interested appeals from domestic pressure groups. The advice of the most
knowledgeable officials was ignored, or even berated. In the Foreign Office, for instance, Brime-
low never liked the possible application of an old-fashioned ‘gunboat diplomacy’ off Iceland.50 So
Gilchrist alone was not overlooked. It was more the rule than the exception, more ‘structure’
than ‘chance.’
On May 24, the government in Reykjavík announced that on September 1 the fishing limit
would be extended to twelve miles. In response, the British authorities publicly declared on June
3 that they would not recognise the act and send warships to protect British vessels ‘on the high
seas.’51 Britain was going to perform and Gilchrist was pleased. But the decision was definitely not
his.
“The Prime Minister says that I have misled him.” Gilchrist and the Immediate
Causes of the “Cod War”
Andrew Gilchrist indisputably possessed a combative character. ‘[N]o one ever doubted
Gilchrist’s courage,’ a colleague later said.52 But he was ‘rude’ and ‘arrogant,’ in the words of an
Icelandic official who was based in the London Embassy during the conflict.53 Ólafur Thors, the
leader of the Independence Party – both the largest and most pro-Western in Iceland – also deve-
loped a special dislike for ‘that idiot’ Andrew Gilchrist.54 Others have spoken fondly of Gilchrist
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and, generally speaking, he certainly liked and admired the Icelandic people.55 Yet he was often
provocative and controversial. ‘He wears an Edward VII beard and ... dresses in the tweediest of
tweeds,’ said the Canadian Ambassador to Iceland after a visit to the country. ‘He is a most en-
tertaining conversationalist but perhaps a little too fond of the well-turned phrase to please the
rather stolid Icelanders.’56 Gilchrist would tell British journalists who visited Iceland that all
fishermen were born liars, and he deliberately encouraged the falsehood that the coast guard ves-
sels would unhesitatingly open fire on British trawlers within the twelve-mile limit!57 But did it
matter? Thors, for example, had led the four-mile fight in the early 1950s and was always deter-
mined to extend the limits further. He was not egged on by Gilchrist’s disposition. In the trawl-
ing ports in Britain, rumours about trigger-happy Icelanders were rife and would have been so
even if he had remained silent. 
What about the claim that Gilchrist sent erroneous reports from Reykjavík? First of all, he is
alleged to have recommended strong-hand tactics which would compel the Icelanders to back
down.58 Again, it may be recalled that Gilchrist found it hard to believe that Britain would or
could threaten the use of force off Iceland and when such a decision was made he was nowhere
near. Furthermore, in the months between Geneva and the ‘cod war’ in September, he vacillated
between belligerence and benevolence. For instance, he again suggested a de facto compromise
whereby Iceland would declare a twelve-mile limit but allow traditional fishing nations to work
up to six miles for the next four years – a solution much on the lines of the ‘cod war’ settlement
in 1961.59 Conversely, his aggressive ideas, which will be discussed later, were usually so wild and
impractical that they were never taken seriously in London.
Another charge against Gilchrist is that he misread the political situation in Iceland. He is said
to have maintained that the drive for extended fishing limits was a communist ploy and that if
only the People’s Alliance would be kicked out of government and the Independents assumed
power, an amicable solution would be found.60 This is wrong. ‘On fishery limits no Icelander is
our friend,’ Gilchrist underlined at the end of the Geneva conference, and in early August he
emphasised that no political party in Iceland was willing to actually withdraw the twelve-mile
decree of May.61 In fact, those who mainly fanned the hopes of a happy ending in the summer of
1958 were Icelandic politicians and officials. The Foreign Minister, the Social Democrat Gud-
mundsson, strove for the collapse of the coalition, co-operation with the Independence Party and
negotiations within the NATO on temporary concessions within the twelve-mile limit, and Hans
G. Andersen, Iceland’s permanent representative at the Alliance’s headquarters in Paris, clearly
disliked his government’s intransigence.62 In late August, when the moment of truth was only
days away and a fleet of four British warships was ready to sail for Iceland, Andersen indicated
that a compromise on an initial six-mile extension was not out of the question.63 A peace treaty
of sorts was hammered out in Paris and hopes were raised in London. But they were quickly
thwarted. After a meeting with Gudmundsson on August 28, Gilchrist telegraphed to the Foreign
Office: ‘I think we are in a mess. The Minister for Foreign Affairs says quite specifically that [the]
text is unacceptable as it stands, and that it is not at all in accordance with his instructions to Hans
Andersen.’64 This news caused deep disappointment in London. Royal Navy warships would now
be pitted against the diminutive Icelandic gunboats. Fortuitously, a final ray of hope appeared on
August 31 when Gilchrist could ascertain in Reykjavík that if a trawler refused to obey coast
guard orders inside twelve miles and immediately appealed for naval assistance, ‘no boarding
attempt will be made.’65 This analysis must have pleased Macmillan. His battle plan at this late
stage seemed to involve a robust but fair establishment of British rights with the option of a dig-
nified retreat towards the last compromise proposal from Paris.66
This was not to happen. On September 1, the twelve-mile regulation took effect in Iceland and
on the following morning the gunboats repeatedly attempted to arrest British trawlers, ignoring
directives from Reykjavík about initial caution. Sailors removed an Icelandic party from one ves-
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sel and trawlermen on another used boathooks, rope-ends and the like to thwart another boar-
ding attempt. A wave of fury swept over Iceland. All chances of a compromise were gone for
good, it seemed.67 How could this have happened? ‘[W]e are already reaping around Iceland the
consequences of the orthodox legal doctrine which we upheld at Geneva,’ the able Thomas
Brimelow pointed out.68 In other words, ‘structural’ reasons lay behind the virtually inevitable
clash. It is true, nonetheless, that – while a conflict was almost bound to happen – in the late sum-
mer of 1958 individuals were determining how exactly it came about. And Macmillan blamed
Gilchrist. ‘The Prime Minister says that I have misled him,’ the Ambassador said in October
when the impasse was complete.69 But Gilchrist had been misled just as much as Macmillan.
Gilchrist had always warned that talks with the Icelanders, including the probing in Paris, could
well prove useless and he could not be expected to foresee that, once the standoff in the disputed
waters had begun, the coast guard captains would almost immediately interpret their orders very
freely. And to reiterate, Gilchrist was not a main mover. In early August, he privately complain-
ed about the ‘nonsense which the Foreign Office and our people in Paris had cooked up for me.’70
Similarly, at the end of the month he wondered, clearly bitten by bad experience, if he should
bother to arrange a meeting with the Icelandic Prime Minister and send home a report on it: ‘For
the record, who would read it?’71
Macmillan’s unfair criticism could have had unfortunate consequences for Gilchrist’s career.
Then again, the ambitious Ambassador did himself no good by what was to follow, his most infa-
mous act in Iceland. It was almost bound to end badly, for it involved the curious but volatile mix-
ture of Gilchrist’s impetuous temperament, Icelandic nationalism, drunken teenagers, Scottish
bagpipes and journalistic craving for hot news.
“For God’s sake, Ambassador, don’t provoke the people.” Gilchrist’s Fateful Moment
of Fame in Reykjavík
At noon on September 2, Reykjavík radio reported on the skirmishes which had occurred that
morning between the coast guard and British trawlers and warships off Iceland. Word immedia-
tely spread that in the evening a demonstration would take place outside the British Ambassa-
dor’s residence. Instead of lying low, Gilchrist now felt that he had been given a good opportunity
to show the world the brutality of the communist-led Icelanders, thus countering the propaganda
that they were poor, innocent fishermen who were being bullied by Britain. He threw a dinner
party and invited a select group of foreign journalists who had flocked to Iceland but – apart from
the lucky ones near the scenes at sea – were still desperately short of ‘hard news.’ While Gilchrist
was excited, Peter Kidson, another member of the British Embassy, feared the worst. ‘For God’s
sake, Ambassador, don’t provoke the people,’ he pleaded in the afternoon, to no avail. ‘I will not
be careful!’ the Ambassador reportedly insisted.72
By dusk, a crowd of a few hundred (some said up to a thousand) had gathered in front of the
residence. But the people were disappointingly timid and Eddie Gilmore, the eminent American
reporter, is to have complained: ‘Mr. Ambassador, there ain’t no action! Looks like you brought
us here under false pretences. No goddam headlines for A.P. out of this serenade.’ Gilchrist had
to take the initiative. Within a minute, the Edinburgh City Police Pipe Band were playing full
blast on the house gramophone The Barren Rocks of Aden.73 The protesters felt grossly pro-
voked. Some entered the house garden and many windows were broken, amid shouts that
‘Vikings never give up!’ This, however, was not a real riot with great significance for the British
cause, as Gilchrist had hoped. ‘Often the jeering struck me as half-hearted,’ one of the journalists
reported, ‘and no real violence was attempted by the crowd, which for the most part was com-
posed of very young people, many of them drunk.’74 Another contention by Gilchrist, that the
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communists were the driving force in the protests, was also incorrect. The most pro-Western of
people were present and the People’s Alliance actually deplored the episode, as did the other
political parties.75
After the outbreak of the ‘cod war’ and Gilchrist’s provocative behaviour, he became something
of a persona non grata in Reykjavík. He was not invited to government functions and most poli-
ticians shunned his company.76 ‘[N]o politician could risk his future in being seen with him,’ the
Canadian Ambassador to Iceland remarked after a visit to the country.77 Thus, Gilchrist had re-
duced what little capability he had to influence events. He made a bad situation worse and there
are some indications that it did harm his career prospects. In the summer of 1959, he privately re-
marked in Reykjavík that ‘the younger set in the Foreign Office’ wanted him to retain his post
until the ‘cod war’ had been brought to a close, whereas the ‘seniors appeared to be against him
and wanted a change.’78 In his memoirs on the Icelandic assignment, Gilchrist also noted some-
what ruefully that ‘Ministers – on whom in the end my promotion depended – were led to regard
me as some sort of Caledonian madman who went round in a kilt playing the bagpipes under a
hail of bricks.’79 At the end of 1959, Gilchrist left Reykjavík and became a Consul General in
Chicago.
Icelandic observers, both then and later, have tended to view this move as a ‘demotion,’ or even
a ‘clear humiliation.’80 This is not true. First of all, Gilchrist was so proud that he indicated that
when Britain accepted defeat in the dispute with Iceland, he would rather be somewhere else.81
Furthermore, the posts in Chicago and Reykjavík were of equal rank in the British Foreign Ser-
vice. It is true that Gilchrist no longer held the post of Ambassador, but he had not arrived as one
in Reykjavík and that assignment was clearly an elevation for him. On balance, it is fair to say
that after his tumultuous stay in Reykjavík, Gilchrist was neither promoted nor demoted. After
Chicago, however, he became Ambassador to Indonesia, a significant post indeed, and he then
ended his career as Ambassador to the Republic of Ireland, always a prestigious position. In short,
few, if any, of Britain’s representatives in Reykjavík have reached as high a post in the British
Foreign Service as Sir Andrew Gilchrist, despite his antics in the first days of the ‘cod war’ in
1958.
“We ought not be deterred by fear of a little bloodshed on the way.” 
Gilchrist’s Suggested “Solutions” to the “Cod War”
Finally, it may be wondered what would have happened if Gilchrist had been able to determine
British policy. At times, his boldness, ambition and pride clouded his judgement and led him to
suggest the most unrealistic and provocative policies. In May 1958, when the British Cabinet was
deciding on naval protection, unbeknownst to the Ambassador in Reykjavík, he suggested that
‘we should catch an Icelandic gunboat in the act, disable her by non-violent means, (query: shoot
her rudder off), tow her to England, and condemn her for piracy in an Admiralty Court.’82
Nothing would have been more likely to unite the Icelanders against Britain (and the NATO, by
implication), and both allies and adversaries would have condemned the government in London
for outdated and imperialistic bullying. The same applied to Gilchrist’s next suggestion: that Bri-
tish banks, where both the Icelandic authorities and individual companies were in constant debt,
demand of these customers that they ‘bring their accounts into balance by September 1.’83
When the ‘cod war’ had begun and the risk of violent clashes at sea was clearly evident,
Gilchrist felt that Britain should hold her course, continue to defend the trawlers and not be
cowed by the ‘fear of a little bloodshed on the way.’84 A short while later, he also suggested that
in retaliation for the arrest of a British trawler, Britain should seize the cargo-passenger liner
Gullfoss, the pride of Iceland’s merchant fleet, next time she arrived in a British port. Alterna-
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tively, Icelandic aircraft could be detained.85 Again, it is easy to imagine the undiluted fury which
would have swept through Iceland had such a course been followed. And it must be added that
these outbursts by Gilchrist were more the exception than the rule. Usually he understood the
constraints on British power and Icelandic strength in the conflict better than the decision-
makers in London.
Conclusion: Gilchrist and the three “cod wars”
The first ‘cod war’ ended in 1961. Britain accepted the twelve-mile limit in return for limited fis-
hing rights inside it for the next three years and a guarantee from the Icelandic centre-right
government, which had then assumed power, that if Iceland extended her limit again in contra-
vention of British wishes, the parties would refer the matter to the International Court of Justice
at The Hague. Despite these provisions, the outcome was a ‘[m]assive Icelandic victory,’ in
Gilchrist’s opinion.86 In 1971, a new, left-wing regime came to power in Reykjavík and declared
itself unbound by the pledge about a referral to the International Court. The following year, the
Icelandic fishing limit was extended to 50 miles. Britain protested and sent civilian vessels to
assist British trawlers in the disputed waters. No warships arrived on the scene until 1973, how-
ever, after a winter of fairly successful harassment by Icelandic coast guard vessels. Not surpri-
singly, a mob of a few thousand young Icelanders gathered outside the British Embassy, smashed
every window and caused great damage to the property.87 This time, of course, Gilchrist had not
been around to ‘incite’ the crowd. The Ambassador, John McKenzie, was a modest and quiet man
who consciously tried to lie low when fevers ran high in Reykjavík.
This second ‘cod war’ ended in late 1973 with a compromise which was, again, rather in favour
of the Icelanders. But the final conflict was still to come. In 1975, a new government in Iceland
extended the limit to 200 miles. Although the international community was moving towards the
codification of such extensive national jurisdiction, the Icelanders were ‘jumping the gun,’ as it
were. For the third time in less than 20 years, the Royal Navy sailed north to protect British
trawlers. This proved to be the hardest conflict, with regular rammings and collisions between the
British protection vessels and the ships of the Icelandic coast guard. Kenneth East, an extremely
able diplomat, could do nothing to prevent the intensification of the dispute and in February 1976
Iceland discontinued diplomatic relations with Britain. East had to leave Reykjavík. Again,
Gilchrist was nowhere near, which serves to support the theory that he was not to blame for the
outbreak of the first ‘cod war.’ To sum up, he was simply an insignificant quantity in the whole
equation. The outcome was the same, with or without him.
This is not to say that individuals do not matter in the great structural scheme of things, but
there were others who mattered more: Prime Minister Macmillan and his Cabinet in Britain, for
instance, and politicians in Iceland. Therefore, the survey of Gilchrist’s involvement in the first
‘cod war’ of 1958-61 casts doubt on the assertion, to quote Lord Strang who headed the Foreign
Office in the early 1950s, that ‘the head of a British diplomatic mission is far from being, in his
negotiating role, the mere relay station or ventriloquist’s dummy that many people suppose him
to be.’88 In fact, he (the notion that a woman could be a head of a diplomatic mission was not re-
cognised at the time) may be said to resemble such a ‘dummy.’ The role of a diplomat remains
important but it is that of a messenger, not a mover. In other words, the diplomat is a ‘pathetic
hero’ in international relations, uninvolved in the internal process of decision-making and bound
by the impassivity of the diplomatic practise.89 The course of the first ‘cod war’ between Iceland
and Britain would have been very similar regardless of the actions and characteristics of Her
Majesty’s Ambassador in Reykjavík. It could have been Micky Mouse or Machiavelli; it would
not have made that much of a difference.
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